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ABSTRACT

Renewal was initially designed to consolidate certain of the Office of Education's categorical discretionary programs and put them to work in a limited number of local sites where educational needs of the Country were most pronounced. The Objectives of Renewal were later expanded to include specific performance or achievement gains by children from low income families, an information base sufficient for 100 percent of OE's decisionmaking needs and 50 percent of State needs, and a substantial degree of communication with local districts about promising innovations. In 1972, Renewal reached an impasse of sizable dimension -- Congressional opposition enacted into law. In this study, the author interviewed about 40 people, who were actors in the Renewal story, to determine the reasons for the demise of the endeavor. Interviewees came from three different segments of the education community: (1) the Office of Education and the Office of the Secretary of HEW, (2) Congress menbers and staff, and (3) education associations, and State and local education agencies. (Parts of pages 1 and 79 may reproduce poorly.) (Author/JF)

EXECUTIVE INITIATIVE YIELDS TO CONGRESSIONAL DICTATE: A STUDY OF EDUCATIONAL RENEWAL, 1971-72

BY

Stephen S. Kaagan

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I. OVERVIEW

At the outset of his first term, President Nixon announced that it was time to cool the elaborate engines that his predecessor had designed, constructed and fired to deal with the social problems faced by the nation. The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, the Higher Education Act of 1965, the Education Professions Development Act of 1967, all important steps, but according to the Nixon team perhaps hasty and ill-advised. It was time to slow the pace of activism and to inject a salutary dose of careful exploration; in effect, "to see what works before launching major new initiatives."

Consequently the only major piece of legislation passed during this Administration was the Education Amendments of 1972, dubbed at its incipience the Higher Education Act. The reason for the change in name is worth noting. By the time of its enactment Congress had turned the original modest bill into a grab-bag of initiatives and amendments - a lot of fine tuning and a measure of new moves.

As the course the Administration intended to pursue became clear, the Office of Education was forced to confront the inevitable question: what should its job be? In the middle of the Johnson years there was little question, in fact little time to ask such a question. With the flow of new federal legislation the Office grew by jerks and jumps, seeking to keep up the tasks involved in administering new money.*

In 1969, 1970 the expansion was slowing, the plethora of obvious tasks slackening, the inevitable question arising. Nixon's first Secretary of HEW, Robert Finch and first Commissioner of Education, James Allen

*See, for example, Stephen K. Bailey and Edith K. Mosher, ESEA: The Office of Education Administers a Law, Syracuse University Press, 1968.

confronted the question with mixed feelings and actions. Their instincts, particularly Allen's, lay with the rush of the previous years - with the activism of getting out there and doing the things that had to be done to address problems. But the brakes were on, and their months in office were frustrating for them and for those who worked with them. The outcome, simply stated, was ambiguity in both mission and action - fits and starts and uneven administration. Eventually, they were both removed from their posts.

Uncomfortable as the Finch and Allen tenure was for both them and the Administration, it did serve the purposes of transition from the war-waging on social problems of the Johnson years to the cautious, deliberative steps Nixon sought. Sitting in the chair of Secretary of HEW by 1970 was Elliott Richardson, and in the chair of the Commissioner of Education, Sidney Marland. The tone set by the former lay in the phrases "institutional reform" and "services integration", that by the latter in "career education" and "renewal". Both had reputations as capable managers, Richardson, in fact, as the administrator superb.

The institutional stamps that were to manifest the directions alluded to were three: Educational Special Revenue Sharing, the National Institute of Education (NIE) and the National Foundation for Higher Education (NFHE). The intent of the first was to give to the states and localities, largely for their discretionary use, lumps of federal dollars currently dispensed by formula from the USOE. The intent of the second was to infuse the country's educational research and development efforts with new vigor, more money and greater intelligence, to garner better results. The intent of the third was to foster

innovation throughout the web of higher education in the United States.

In addition to these three, Secretary Richardson and Commissioner Marland perceived the need for a fourth initiative to meet the mandate that the President had outlined: Educational Renewal. Through a consolidation of OE's "discretionary" grant funds (about five percent of its elementary and secondary program money), Renewal would seek to become a frontrunner of innovation in education. It would funnel these consolidated dollars to selected local districts, ask them to assess their needs and act as a broker of new ideas and products that might meet those needs. In effect, Renewal would be at one and the same time an action arm of what NIE and NFHE came up with and a stimulator of questions that NIE might answer. It would also be a fitting companion-piece to Special Revenue Sharing, with Revenue Sharing being the "few-strings-attached" return of resources to the states and localities, Renewal being the somewhat more-strings-attached provision of dollars to selected local districts.

Unlike the other three institutional patterns with which it was linked, Renewal was not generated in the White House. Rather, it was proposed by the Office of Education, and it gained enough support from the Office of the Secretary of HEW to become an Administration initiative. Renewal's genesis was in part a reaction on the part of the Office of Education to the impending presence of its three companions. Put simply, OE had to ask itself what sort of operation it would be after the advent of Revenue Sharing, NIE and NFHE. With Revenue Sharing much of OE's present staff would be engaged in check-writing to states and institutions rather than in program building. To NIE went all the

research and development functions. To NFHE went all the exciting higher-education development. OE's answer to the question was that it would be Revenue Sharing plus Renewal, the latter to be its "cutting edge".

In what state these four initiatives are at present (March, 1973) is worth noting. NIE has been established and is beginning the fight for survival and growth. NFHE has not been fully established by law; rather, a forerunner program to fund innovations in post-secondary education was authorized, as in the case of NIE, by the Education Amendments of 1972. Educational Special Revenue Sharing, having died in 1972, has been reintroduced in Congress by the Nixon administration. Renewal, unlike its companions, met an impasse of sizable dimension - Congressional opposition enacted into law. Section 302 of the Education Amendments of 1972 amends Section 421-C of the General Education Provision Act and reads in part:

LIMITATIONS ON AUTHORITY

---no provision of any law shall be construed to authorize the consolidation of any applicable program with any other program. Where the provisions of law---permit---packaging or consolidation---, nothing in this subparagraph shall be deemed to interfere with such packaging or consolidation.

"(B) No provision of any law which authorizes an appropriation---for an applicable program shall be construed to authorize the consolidation of any such program with any other program unless provision for such a consolidation is expressly made thereby.

"(C) For the purposes of this subsection, the term 'consolidation' means any agreement, arrangement, or other procedure which results in -

"(i) the commingling of funds derived from one appropriation with those derived from another appropriation,

"(ii) the transfer of funds derived from an appropriation to the use of an activity not authorized by the law authorizing such appropriation,

"(iii) the use of practices or procedures which have the effect of requiring, or providing for, the approval of an

application for funds derived from different appropriations according to any criteria other than those for which provision is made (either expressly or implicitly) in the law which authorizes the appropriation of such funds, or this title, or

"(iv) as a matter of policy the making of a grant or contract involving the use of funds derived from one appropriation dependent upon the receipt of a grant or contract involving the use of funds derived from another appropriation."

The impact of 421-C on the people and organizations who took part in the Renewal fray has been substantial. And even after the dust settled the full extent had yet to be felt.

Item: It is argued, but hard to substantiate, that relations between the Congress and the Office of Education reached an all-time low with the controversy over Renewal. Charges on the part of Congressional staff of administration tomfoolery, mendacity and downright perfidy were rampant. Added to these - assumed to be part of normal interchange between the Executive and the Congress - was an edge of bitterness and spite. The point reached clearly was well beyond standard posturing; it extended to a level that was frightening to those concerned about the survival of effective government.*

Item: The Office of Education people who were to oversee Renewal and make it work were profoundly smitten. Some left the Office for jobs elsewhere in government; others left the federal service altogether. Most, however, remained, prey to daily frustration and despair. Their previous occupational stakes had been lifted to make

*One Congressional staffer, for example, of the same party as the Administration, refused to talk with me about Renewal. My conjecture - and that is all it is - was that his antagonism and resentment ran so high that he just could not countenance a discussion on Renewal.

way for Renewal, but no new ones had been implanted. A vacuum was left where there might have been a discernible and substantial mission. As one person put it, "the Bureau was asked to do things no organization should have been asked to do - and now what do we have for it?" "Wasteland" is one way of encapsulating the state of affairs that prevailed after the demise of Renewal.

Item: On a purely organizational level, what was intended to be a super sub-unit within the Office was devastated. Left in the fold, after the disabling legislative language became law, were three "bureaus" and two offices, comprising 400 people and budgeted at well under $200 million. Envisioned was a unit substantially larger: half again as many people and almost double the dollars - all projected within one or two years. As with all bureaucratic losses, momentum is perhaps more important than a loss at a given juncture. And the direction of the momentum post-Renewal pointed to further erosion.

Item: The most far-reaching and least easy to grasp outcome are the constraints that 421-C puts on the future operation of all USOE and NIE programs. 421-C could become a lever for Congressional oversight to ensure that legislative authorities are interpreted narrowly rather than broadly, that categorical legislation in education is viewed more readily in terms of its own peculiar purposes than in terms of larger purposes that might be served. Whether such a state of affairs is desirable is scarcely a moot point.

II. "I NEVER REALLY KNEW WHAT RENEWAL WAS"

"I never really knew what Renewal was". So commented most of the individuals I interviewed.* For the first third of the interviews I took the statement at face value, assuming that people for one reason or another did not grasp the concepts of Renewal. I now feel somewhat differently about what was motivating the statement. Each time I encountered it I managed later in the interview to turn it back on the interviewee. Almost without exception he was able to identify readily several characteristics of Renewal. Curiously, the same set of characteristics surfaced on most occasions and they were normally on the mark. For instance, "consolidation of discretionary resources" and "providing resources for local definition of problems" appeared in almost everyone's description - from the most vigorous and vociferous opponents to those who took a neutral position to the arch-advocates of the idea.

Agreed, the descriptors which people furnished with frequency and relative uniformity did not adequately communicate how Renewal was actually to work. Perhaps the actors said they did not know what Renewal was because of confusion over the shape of the gears and how they would mesh. At the same time a degree of vagueness - sometimes a substantial

*To write this case study, I interviewed about forty people who were actors in the Renewal story. Some of my interviews were brief; some were several hours long. Interviewees came from three different segments of the "education community": 1) the Office of Education and the Office of the Secretary in HEW (included here were people in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation and the Office of Assistant Secretary for Legislation as well as the inner Office of the Secretary itself; 2) Congress: members and staff but mostly staff; and 3) the "field": the education associations, state education agencies, institutions of higher education and local education agencies. In addition, I read all the documents I could lay hands on that seemed to be related to Renewal.

degree - is present at the proposal stage of any new endeavor. There had to be a better explanation for the fact that the statement "I never really knew what Renewal was" was on everyone's lips.

Rather than just a cognitive concern, the statement seemed to be a vehicle for voicing discontent and, in some cases, frustration over what happened in the course of the idea's development: the manner in which the idea was framed and communicated in OE, the organizational changes it wrought, the way it was communicated to various outside constituencies, the steady build-up of Congressional opposition leading to its impasse and the setbacks the Department incurred in the aftermath.

These distinctions are fine; nonetheless they seem worth drawing. For they highlight the central finding that Renewal was rather simple and comprehensible when viewed as "general idea", but extremely complicated as an operational process or program, thus raising all sorts of knotty problems. Further, in its movement from general idea to operational process or program, it raised so many hackles, drew so much opposition that its supporters were forced to back down. The deeply unsettling nature of such controversy more than anything else lay behind the statement "I never really knew what Renewal was". The motivating forces were not the conceptual complexities as much as the gnawing emotional ones that arose in the elaboration of the idea and its promulgation within a network of the strong forces which impinge on governmental decision-making.

What then was Renewal? Early documentation* written by its proponents during the spring of 1971 presented Renewal as a mechanism to

*I paraphrase here a series of about seven documents written by OE staff between April and August, 1971.

consolidate certain of OE's categorical discretionary programs and put them to work in a limited number of local sites where the educational needs of the country were most pronounced, i.e. low-income areas. The primary function of the mechanism was to inject into the educational process at those sites the best of what had been researched, developed and tested - teaching methods and technological aids, for instance. Such infusion was to follow upon a carefully carried-out survey of needs and problems sponsored by a group representing all educational interests in a given community.

By late summer, 1971, the idea of Renewal had undergone further elaboration, as the available documents show.* The objectives of the endeavor were expanded to include specific performance or achievement gains by children from low-income families, an information base sufficient for 100% of OE's decision-making needs and 50% of the needs of the states, and a substantial degree of communication with local districts about promising innovations. In effect, this later elaboration included:

- the explicit mandate for Renewal to work hand in hand with NIE.
- the notion that the activities of the National Center for Educational Statistics were integral to the Renewal effort.
- the assertion of broad usefulness for Educational Extension Agents, people aware of new practices and products and sensitive to how and where they should be used. These agents would be called upon by local districts, some of

*See footnote p. 8.

which would have Renewal sites, for technical assistance in the form of demonstrations, solutions to instructional problems and designation of usable resources.

Also included was the presumption that the hub of activity at a Renewal site would be a Teacher Center, patterned in large part after the facility which had gained so much currency in Great Britain. The Center would be an actual place where a panoply of staff development activities would occur for the experienced and novice alike.

These later documents also outlined certain procedural requisites. For instance, the state education agencies were given the power to nominate a limited number of their local districts as candidates for Renewal sites. Sites were to comprise one high school, two junior high schools and several elementary schools. In the case of large urban districts this would mean that only part of a district or sub-district would be included; in the case of rural districts it might mean a combination of several districts would have to come together. Finally, to simplify the grant application process, nominated districts were to be allowed to submit essentially one proposal for a grant derived from several categorical sources.

On a more interpretative level, Renewal can be viewed as a hybrid of Johnsonian and Nixonian efforts in education. Whereas the Johnson administration concentrated on the enactment of categorical programs designed to address certain identifiable education problems, the Nixon administration has sought to establish policies such as Revenue Sharing that allow others to build programs, and to create new institutional arrangements such as the National Institute of Education and the National

Foundation for Higher Education, as a base for new programming. Renewal drew from both these emphases.

On the one hand, Renewal had the aspect of a policy: concentrating resources by pulling together selected categorical programs, delivering these resources to a limited number of school districts selected not on the basis of proposals per se but on the basis of whether they met certain criteria and were willing to do certain things. For instance, did the district have a concentration of underachieving children from low-income homes? Was it willing to engage seriously in a process of defining its problems, making major changes to help solve them and assessing whether the changes made any difference? Was it willing to allow the participation of a variety of local institutions, agencies and individuals in decision-making processes? Was it receptive to outside assistance - technical and otherwise? Was it inclined to add resources to the Renewal effort beyond those provided by a Renewal grant?

On the other hand, Renewal also had the aspect of a program. First there was to be the establishment of Teacher Centers and the training and use of Educational Extension Agents. Second, although there would not be the normal flow of proposals to Washington from appropriate institutions seeking support, there would be an elaborate screening process (in which the state education agency would play a central role). At the end of the process relatively few sites would be selected. In effect, though not operating exactly like a program, Renewal would come out with the same result: only a few would get the money. If a policy at all, then, it was not one which was universally applicable. There would be clear discriminations made and certain

sites would be selected over others.

Another way of understanding Renewal is through the analogy of a partnership in which both partners subject themselves to marked changes at the time of their coming together. One partner, the Office of Education, alters its administration of programs, puts all its discretionary resources under one aegis, the Office of the Deputy Commissioner for Development, and seeks to dispense that money in packages to selected constituents who can meet certain criteria. The other partner, the local district, agrees to initiate certain internal mechanisms such as a governing board for the Renewal effort, broadly representative of parties interested in the educational process, and to commit itself to certain processes such as needs assessment, planning and evaluation.

These then were Renewal's most prominent contours. What happened between the time these contours were laid out and the time that organizational devastation lay in the wake of controversy is the main substance of this paper.

III. ORIGINS

In March, 1971, Dr. Don Davies assumed the post of Deputy Commissioner of Education for Development, a second-line position in the Office directly under the Commissioner. For the previous three and a half years he had served as the first head of the Bureau of Educational Personnel Development, a unit set up specifically to administer the Education Professions Development Act of 1967. As the new Deputy Commissioner for Development (DCD) he took over a unit composed of four "bureaus": his former bailiwick, BEPD; the National Center for Educational Research and Development; the National Center for Educational Statistics; and the National Center for Educational Communications.

Accompanying Davies to his new post were three of the central staff who had worked with him at the BEPD: Russ Wood, his Deputy, Mary Hoag, a special assistant, and Barbara Kawauchi, his administrative assistant/secretary. In the weeks which followed his arrival in new territory, Davies, assisted by Wood and Hoag, deliberated long and hard about what to do with that territory. What developed from those deliberations was a plan to gather and consolidate under the umbrella of DCD as many of the Office of Education's discretionary programs as was sensible and possible; and, having assumed fiscal control over these programs, to use their resources to underwrite the establishment in selected local school districts of National Educational Renewal Centers. Referred to as NERC's, they would be vehicles for comprehensive school reform. Exactly how they would serve such a purpose was not entirely clear. Early attempts by Wood to put something in writing about NERC's, concentrated heavily on how the internal Office of Education arrangements

would be brought about. The short one or two pages devoted to the operation of the NERC's spoke mostly about their use as a funnel for "promising practices and products" developed outside a given district. The picture was of a training facility which would expose experienced professionals to better ways of doing their jobs.

These early documents have been criticized for their overemphasis on intra-organizational rearrangements and their failure to do more than touch the surface of programmatic substance. Yet they were inside documents and they surely did not reflect all the ideas that people had about what NERC's might be and do. Nonetheless, one might be tempted to offer this observation: the documents do reflect a priority of concerns. The pure bureaucratic issues - what pieces were going to be where in the Office of Education cosmos so that NERC's might come into being - were high on the list of things thought about. The reason behind this is not hard to fathom. In a bureaucracy, worrying about the configuration of the pipes often precedes concern over what is to flow through them. But what starts out as a chronological priority - bureaucratic rearrangement - becomes an all-subsuming priority, leaving sound substantive planning to the fates. In those months which framed Renewal's "birth", this condition was more present than not. On other matters regarding the planning for Renewal there is much more to say later.

The first threads of Renewal did not materialize out of thin air. On the contrary, several lines of origin might be traced. First, there is little question that the priorities which Davies had established and acted upon as head of BEPD played a large role in why Renewal came

about. At the beginning of his tenure at BEPD he presided over a set of programs whose main focus was higher education training for educational personnel. By the end of his tenure the focus had shifted to programs that were operating out of local education agencies or local education agencies in concert with institutions of higher education. And most of this new generation of programs had as their main clientele low-income people. The Urban/Rural School Development Program and the Career Opportunities Program are good examples of this shift of priority. The first offered resources to selected school districts interested in upgrading their staff development activities. The second provided for the recruiting and training of paraprofessionals by a local district in cooperation with a local college or university. In both there was heavy emphasis on involving a diversity of local agencies and individuals in the running of the programs.

There were other lines of origin for Renewal to which one could point. Project Trend, initiated by the Office of Education in 1968, offered a limited number of school districts modest incentives to draw resources together from a number of different legislative authorities and levels of government. "The plan was to develop school system-wide programs based upon a needs assessment which would enable a Community Planning Task Force to develop a comprehensive program design for which the system would seek local, state and federal support."* Trend still exists today with about 14 sites. For lack of money and the persistence

*From the introduction to an internal OE document describing Trend.

of high-level sponsorship, however, it never really amounted to much beyond a "pilot" program.

Louisville, Kentucky, through the ingenuity and forcefulness of its Superintendent of Schools, had accumulated resources from a number of EPDA programs. On its own initiative, the Louisville system put them all together, coupled them with other federal education money and used this combination of resources to underwrite a reform effort. The actual nature of that effort, although impressive, is not of concern here. What is important is to understand that Davies and his colleagues at BEPD were extremely enthusiastic about the goings-on in Louisville and saw this city's efforts as emblematic of what could be done elsewhere.

The origins just described were direct-line sources: people central to the Renewal effort, such as Davies and Wood, had played a part in their development. But in addition to these sources there were other previous efforts which bore a definitive relationship to Renewal. How aware Davies et al. were of their bearing on Renewal is not clear, but two things are. Were they not aware they should have been; and were they aware they should have engaged in a careful, even if necessarily abbreviated, investigation of what happened to the efforts I am about to recount.

The Bureau of Elementary and Secondary Education in the Office of Education was set up following the enactment of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. Its mission was to administer most of the funds appropriated under that legislative authority. About 1968, Nolan Estes, then head of the Bureau,* decided that it would make good

*Now Superintendent of Schools, Dallas, Texas.

sense to try to package resources appropriated under separate titles of the Act. His hope was that the different monies could be put together in such a way as to simplify procedures by which the money reached those who were to put it to use and to amplify the degree of impact the dollars were having.

There were two forms that the packaging effort took. One was designed to see if OE might be able to get a small number of urban school districts to consolidate certain federal resources and put them to work on specific problems. The Titles involved were III and I of ESEA and XI of the National Defense Education Act. According to certain OE staff, this program, dubbed the "Central Cities Project", grew out of a concern that Title III, ESEA programs (innovative local projects) had been little more than peripheral add-ons to school district attempts at tackling problems. The hope of the Central Cities Project people was that targeted funds from a number of different sources could make more of a dent than Title III alone.

Initial OE plans for this endeavor remained tentative until strong positive responses from various state and local education people were received. At that juncture, plans were made to try out the idea in ten districts. OE personnel asserted that at all times, during both the planning and initial implementation phases, the legislative intent of the different titles was respected. For instance, different audit tracks were set up for each title. And since there were only a few cities involved, the impression was one of a pilot or demonstration program.

About the time Estes was working on the Central Cities Project

he also set out to induce the state education agencies to consolidate administrative funds available under various ESEA titles. The goal was to have the states package money from as many titles as possible and to use this concentration of resources in a "more efficient and effective way". Apparently, a few states - Texas in particular - had already been doing this and others seemed interested, too.

While the planning was pushing ahead on these two efforts, Congressional staff aides, having gotten wind of the ideas, called the appropriate OE parties to the Hill. There they were warned about the dangers of contravening legislative intent and of commingling funds from different legislative authorities. On the Central Cities Project the fur flew no further than the doors of the conference room in which they met. Assurances from Estes that the project would remain small and that no commingling would ensue were apparently enough to let it survive, but certainly not enough to let it grow. Ironically, the controversy over this project became an academic matter shortly after. Estes left the Office and the project - a "personal pet" - withered away.

On the packaging of administrative funds which Estes proposed, the issue reached the floor of the Senate where an amendment was introduced by Senator Wayne Morse to the Vocational Education Act of 1968. The amendment specifically forbade the commingling of funds from different authorities and requested the Commissioner of Education to submit a report to Congress one year hence on the feasibility of program consolidation. Later, in the Senate-House Conference which met to iron out differences on the bill, the first provision of the amendment was dropped. Apparently between the introduction of the amendment and

the adoption of the Conference Report the interested members received enough assurances from the Office of Education to convince them to drop the harsher of the two provisions. And the second, although enacted into law, was ignored by the Executive Branch.

A search for the origins of Renewal should not end with the identification of forerunners, namely programs, initiatives and exemplary sites. As discrete entities they bear a relatively clear relationship to the subject of investigation here. There are other pre-Renewal elements, not so discrete but nonetheless heralding the Renewal effort.

For several years preceding Davies' appointment as DCD there had been concern in several corners of the bureaucracy about the proliferation of categorical programs. Whether these programs were formula or discretionary was immaterial. Minimum managerial sense dictated that some sort of consolidation would be desirable. Estes' attempts have been mentioned, but there were others. Peter Muirhead, now the Deputy Commissioner for Higher Education and one who has been with USOE for 15 years, asserted that not too long after the passage of the ESEA, people in the Office began to talk about ways to increase organizational coherency. Indeed, the EPDA of 1967 was itself a consolidation and broadening of a number of far narrower categorical training authorities. The Vocational Education Act of 1968 also consolidated earlier categories and provided for broader educational applications. Yet the record indicates little major action overall. Add to this set of persistent inclinations toward consolidation a change in administration - from one in which education efforts ballooned to one in which there was restrained growth - and it is possible to see why such inclinations

might become metamorphosized into action, why activities devoted to expansion might yield to activities devoted to consolidation. Revenue Sharing, NIE and NFHE reflected this shift and Renewal did also.

À propos of the sort of shift involved here is an August 1969 proposal by Tom Burns of the Bureau of Elementary and Secondary Education. Entitled the "Educational Renewal Act", it called for the creation of ways for school districts throughout the country to partake of the benefits of innovative practices developed with the aid of 60's dollars. The impetus behind the document was obvious: "No one was using all those good things which OE money helped generate." The psychological set behind it was not far from obvious either: "Let us substitute for uncontrolled growth, controlled operation; let us be somewhat more introspective, deliberate and managerial instead of extroverted, experimental and abundant."

Beyond its reflecting a turn in course, the proposal offers two other interesting pieces of information. It reveals that the name "Educational Renewal" had been around well before its attachment to the 1971 effort with which we are concerned here. Second, the purpose the proposal seeks to fulfill is exactly the same as that articulated in the spring 1971 planning documents which laid the groundwork for Renewal.

Thus, it is clear that there were elements in the environment of the education bureaucracy which both presaged and nurtured Renewal. To oversimplify, when the grand theme of Renewal was ready, the time and place seemed right. All that was needed was the right mix of actors to put the pieces together into a full-blown initiative. As it turned out, the appropriate characters were there at the right time and place to spur the ideas into action.

After James Allen had left the Commissionership in early summer 1970, Terrell H. Bell* was appointed Acting Commissioner. In the late summer, Bell and some of his colleagues, including Don Davies, were called to the Office of the new Secretary of HEW, Elliott Richardson. The question Richardson posed was: assuming Special Revenue Sharing for the bulk of OE programs, what else will OE be? Apparently Bell's response was that OE would try to effect a consolidation of its discretionary programs and use this package as some sort of vehicle for school reform. To this still loosely-articulated direction Richardson was said to have responded with marked enthusiasm.

In fall, 1970, Commissioner-designate Sidney P. Marland Jr., working out of a temporary office at the Brookings Institution, conferred with several OE personages. His concern, like Richardson's, was for the development of initiatives. The upshot of his conference was much the same as the Secretary's, that some sort of consolidation of programs directed at comprehensive reform made good sense. And in meeting with a diversity of school district people from around the country, he confirmed that such a move would be welcome, indeed sought-after.

Don Davies, throughout his tenure as Associate Commissioner for Educational Personnel Development, had been searching for an engine for school reform. In an attempt to find the beginnings of a design for it, he had been manipulating the Bureau in ways which some argue were ill-advised, others beyond the bounds of Congressional intent. But his purposes were clear - to try to use the money in such a way as to bring

*Now Superintendent of Schools, Salt Lake City, and former Commissioner of Education of Utah.

about needed changes in the way children were educated. Admittedly, training of educational personnel per se is not a particularly strong lever to achieve these purposes - and Davies knew that, too. So at BEPD he began to concentrate on the question of what sort of "strings" ought to be attached to dollars to increase their impact. For instance, who should get the money - school systems, universities, other agencies? Who should play a role in the governance of the programs supported by the money? School administrators, university representatives, parents, members of minority groups, others? Whom would the dollars help train? If teachers, teachers of what? Administrators? Paraprofessionals? In effect, Davies and others at BEPD began to tinker with what kinds of trainees, grantees and governance mechanisms would make a difference. A quick assessment of his constitutional make-up and abiding concerns therefore suggests that he was prepared to become a champion of something like Renewal.

Davies' right-hand man in the Bureau of Educational Personnel Development was Russ Wood. An enigmatic, reticent character, he formed quite a contrast with Davies, who was affable, responsive, outgoing. In further contrast, Wood was a career bureaucrat, Davies an interloper on the bureaucratic scene. Wood had been deputy to John F. Hughes, the top internal management person in OE prior to 1965. He had also been integrally involved with the establishment of OE's Office of Program Planning and Evaluation and, later on, the Bureau of Educational Personnel Development. His view of the world could best be described as managerial, that is, concerned with what configurations the pieces might be arranged in to get something done. This does not mean he had

no ideas; rather that his ideas, when articulated, seemed to have the bureaucratic implications built into them. So for somewhat different reasons from Davies he, too, appeared to be ready to foster the idea of Renewal.

In sum: the new leadership in HEW in 1970, Elliott Richardson, fully advocated rationalized operations and he was prepared to see something like Renewal as a major step forward, a) because it fit his inclinations and b) because it responded to the major organizational question: what would OE be other than a check-writing operation, assuming enactment of Special Revenue Sharing.

The new leadership in OE in 1970, Sidney Marland, was casting about for initiatives, things which would mark his tenure in office. He warmed easily to an initiative like Renewal, which seemed in tune with the Administration's predilections in general and those of the Secretary in particular and which also offered the hope for significant school reform.*

Don Davies and Russ Wood, moving in Renewal-like directions throughout their service at BEPD, were, of course, protagonists. With the elevation of Davies to the Deputyship for Development the scene was set.

Others in the Office, either vaguely through statements they made or more specifically through programs they administered, served the cause of sufficient precedent. That is, they lent the launching of Renewal enough credibility and worth to make it a thing which seemed

*Democratic party members and staff on Capitol Hill would say that such an approach is "typically Republican".

right to do.

And there was something more: one of those factors that makes this story so intriguing. It's called "The Good Idea Syndrome". Almost everyone who was interviewed said at some point in his set of responses, "you know, Renewal was a good idea...". Like many ideas generated to solve social problems, there is little controversy about them at the level of "good idea". Renewal - at that level - had an intoxicating persuasive aspect, which lulled participants and observers alike into a somewhat uncritical state of mind. It was as if at a mythical juncture, after the idea first made its way across the brain's mental circuitry and before the brain hypothesized details with which to quarrel, there was enough of a "massaging of the wires" to allow ready acceptance. Whether or not the operational forms the idea took would be effective was quite another matter. And whether or not consensus at the level of "good idea" would disintegrate into disabling controversy at the level of operation was another matter, too. The possibilities for these two outcomes were no different for Renewal than for any other idea. In the case of Renewal, however, there was a sufficient number of people who assumed too much would happen simply out of a sense that Renewal was "a good idea". This assertion applies to everyone in the agency concerned with substantiating and selling it, from the Secretary of HEW on down.

IV. HAPPENINGS EN ROUTE

The beginnings: a critical decision is made

When Don Davies was asked by Commissioner Marland to accept the job of Deputy Commissioner for Development, he was told that he would be the person in the Office in charge of "moving and shaking". With this mandate from the Commissioner and with the beginnings of marked enthusiasm on the part of the Secretary, Davies decided that he would move quickly. In a matter of a few weeks he and his staff had defined the general parameters of an OE reorganization that would shift almost all the discretionary programs in the Office (except those serving the handicapped and the vocational programs) from other units to his Deputyship. Complementing this "inside step" was the development of an outside strategy, the establishment in local districts of National Educational Renewal Centers.

The plans, hatched in relative haste, were presented for the first time to other OE Deputy Commissioners and the Commissioner at an April retreat held at Airlie House in rural Virginia. Charts in hand, Davies -- with Wood and Hoag assisting - presented their version of initial legislative specifications for an Educational Renewal Act. Their intent was to have such legislation introduced as a companion-piece to the Education Special Revenue Sharing Bill which was being developed at that time.*

*In November, 1970, Secretary Richardson had addressed the Chief State School Officers at their annual convention in Miami. In that speech the Secretary proposed two pieces of legislation: (1) one concerning education special revenue sharing, (2) one concerning consolidation of discretionary programs in education.

Reportedly, there was a good deal of enthusiasm on the part of the Commissioner and his Deputies for the proposal which Davies set forth. At the same time, there was skepticism from a number of quarters about the submission to Congress of legislation covering the Renewal effort. The reasons for this skepticism are complex but worth tracing because they led to a decision not to seek legislation on Renewal. That decision was taken by the Commissioner at Airlie House and, as we shall see, it had a profound impact on the fate of the effort.

At the outermost ring of reasons is the stance of the Administration on Executive-Congressional relations. To begin with, the Administration has been facing a Congress dominated by the opposition party. This fact alone explains their marked tenderness about interacting with the legislature on almost any issue. Second, the ethos which infuses the Administration has not been one which assumes there is much to be gained by excessive involvement in legislative politics; on the contrary, the ethos has been that good governance depends in large part on good managerial skills. By deduction, the tendency of the Nixon contingent has been to assume broad executive discretion across the board, in both foreign and domestic affairs.

Added to these is a sense, commented upon by several actors, that those who surround the President have not been particularly adept at dealing with the Congress. The assertion is that they do not understand, nor do they care to understand, how to operate effectively in the political push and pull of the legislative arena. The result has been a rejection on their part of Congress as a legitimate and co-equal partner.

Understanding the attitude of the Office of Management and Budget

on matters of legislation is helpful here, too. OMB above all else has been concerned with the level of government spending, and its effect on inflation. Its assumption has been that if something gets legislated it will mean increased federal spending. The intimations have been that not only is Congress Democratic and therefore wont to spend more than if it were Republican, but also that legislators, regardless of stripe, need to "bring home the bacon" to their constituencies in order to get re-elected. OMB has therefore been inclined to be negative on new legislation in almost all areas.

Closer to the central core of reasons, the approach of the Office of the Secretary in HEW was to seek an expansion of discretionary powers within existing legislative authorities. Representatives of the Office of the Secretary had over the past few years argued long and hard in Congress to gain acceptance of such broader powers. All of this made eminent sense given the declared goal of the Secretary to achieve a more rational allocation of federal resources. One cannot do a lot of the pipe-twisting necessary to achieve such a goal unless wide administrative discretion is allowed.

Still closer to the core: of the two pieces of legislation recommended by Richardson in his November, 1970 address to the Chief State School Officers in Miami, one, Education Special Revenue Sharing, was already in the mill. First formulated as legislative specifications in January 1971, the proposal was to move through the proper executive clearance procedures and arrive in Congress in October, 1971. For a variety of reasons, OMB forced a telescoping of the process and legislation was introduced in late April or early May. When introduced it met with the deathly pall of Congressional apathy, including that

of most Republican members. For one thing, it offered little new money, a mere $200 million over and above the three billion it would pull together from existing authorities.

Since the time-line for introducing the Revenue Sharing legislation had been compressed, HEW and OE legislative specialists were in a somewhat frenetic state. And all of this at the same time that Davies was coming forth with a proposal to introduce the companion-piece. Added to the boggle, of course, was the cool reception Education Revenue Sharing received in Congress. If one piece received this kind of greeting, what would happen to the other, it too "pulling things together" and offering little new money?

On another - perhaps more important - legislative front, the Administration had sent to Congress the previous year its one major piece of education legislation: the Higher Education Act. In it lay all sorts of measures: affecting institutional support for colleges and universities, altering student aid provisions, establishing the National Institute of Education and the National Foundation for Higher Education. This bill, in the spring of 1971, still existed in two versions, one Senate, one House, and it was waiting on the calling-together of a bicameral conference to resolve differences.

In the judgment of the legislative specialists in OE and HEW, a Renewal bill, if introduced alongside the Higher Education Act, would confound the chances for a successful conference on and passage of certain provisions of that Act. The crux of their concern was the lack of clarity in the Renewal proposal; specifically, they feared that it would be perceived by legislators as somehow overlapping NIE's turf. How they

could have perceived this I am not entirely sure. Whether it was their incapacity to understand or the Renewal advocates' incapacity to communicate or some combination of both remains somewhat elusive to me. But the existence of their perception that Renewal legislation would have jeopardized legislative approval of the NIE was a key element in the decision not to go for legislation.

Finally we are at the core of reasons behind the decision not to go for legislation: on the scene was a Commissioner relatively new to his job and therefore not particularly experienced in Executive-Congressional relations. But because he was new to the job he was looking for initiatives to put his stamp on.. And he had been led to believe that his job was to forge ahead. He had been schooled by the Office of the Secretary to avoid the legislative route whenever possible, and he, too, favored broadening the base of the Executive Branch's discretionary powers.

Also on the scene were the agency's legislative specialists generating a sense that a Renewal proposal would be greeted with the same reception as its companion, Education Special Revenue Sharing. Further, perhaps from a somewhat premature understanding of what Renewal was about, their judgment was that the legislative authority to do it already existed, approximately if not definitively.* And if one sensed that the authority already existed it would be more than ill-advised to go to the legislature. That would be a seeking of authority the agency already had.

*Remember, the first documentation of Renewal made the idea sound much more like a management notion than a substantive programmatic one.

Accompanying these two parties to the juncture of decision was a newly-appointed Deputy Commissioner for Development, ambitious and impatient to get things moving on an effort that he felt had good chances of bring about needed school reform. He knew, as did his colleagues, that getting legislative approval took time. And if progress on the Higher Education Act was any measure, Renewal might get underway as late as 1974. Davies, perhaps more than Marland, rued that possibility.

The actors with their motivations and concerns, the collection of associated events which framed the decision they had to make, the controlling ethos of an administration in power and the general partisan political atmosphere - put together they made the decision to avoid the legislative route a foregone conclusion.

The slow crawl on reorganization and its ramifications

Having made the decision to proceed as if they had the authority, OE leadership resolved to move first on the matter of internal reorganization. At the same time, they agreed that substantive planning on Renewal would proceed as quickly as possible. The hope was to have selected local districts planning for National Educational Renewal Centers during the 1972 fiscal year (July 1971 - June 1972) and to have a limited number of operational centers in place during the 1973 fiscal year.

Apparently none of the OE leadership - Marland, Davies or Charles Saunders, Deputy Commissioner for External Relations and USOE's top legislative aide - felt the need to put together strategies beyond the

vague one of "moving ahead". Specifically, there was no attempt to reach consensus on how to deal with Congress: what to say to them when they registered concern, when to say anything to them, who should speak for and "explain" Renewal, and how to alleviate their concern. It was not as if Congressional opposition was unexpected. The question of authority was dubious enough to assure opposition; the legislative experts knew that. Second, there was no attempt to develop a strategy for communicating Renewal to various constituencies. Would the proposal be widely publicized? Selectively publicized? Played up? Played down? In other words, who would be privy to what and when? As will be seen, the failure to come up with game plans in these arenas caused enormous havoc for the Renewal effort in the months which followed the initial euphoria of the Airlie House meeting.

Directly on the heels of Airlie, Davies and company took a first cut at what the expanded Deputyship would look like. Several programs then under DCD would remain there after the shuffle, a few would not. Those that would were:

-- All Bureau of Educational Personnel Development Programs, i.e. all money appropriated under the EPDA except that under Part E of the Act, which provided for training of administrative personnel for institutions of higher education.

-- The National Center for Educational Statistics; included were all the resources for surveys and studies, of which the National Assessment Program of the Education Commission

of the States was the largest piece.*

-- The National Center for Educational Communication; all dissemination activities including the Educational Resource Information Center (ERIC) files.

Two programs would be removed from the Deputyship, their destination to be in NIE when and if it was established by law:

-- The National Center for Educational Research and Development, under whose aegis most of the Office's Research and Development dollars were administered. The regional educational labs and R & D centers and the research training grant programs were lodged here.

-- The Experimental Schools program, a highly-touted demonstration project.

Several programs, all discretionary, would be transferred to the DCD from other Deputyships:

-- Project Follow Through - from the Bureau of Elementary and Secondary Education.

-- ESEA, Title III Program, both that part controlled by the states (85% of the program money) and that part the Commissioner could dispense at his discretion (15%) - from the Bureau of Elementary and Secondary Education.

-- ESEA Title VII Program, the Bilingual Education Program - from the Bureau of Elementary and Secondary Education.

*The NAP was actually in the National Center for Educational Research and Development at the time of Davies' arrival in DCD, but it was transferred to the National Center for Educational Statistics shortly thereafter.

-- ESEA Title VIII Program, Drop-Out Prevention - from the Bureau of Elementary and Secondary Education.

-- The Technology Division of the Bureau of Libraries and Educational Technology, to be formed into the National Center for Educational Technology - from the Office of the Deputy Commissioner for Higher Education.

-- The EPDA - Part E Program - from the Bureau of Higher Education.

-- The Trend Program - from the Bureau of Elementary and Secondary Education.

-- Several "National Priority Programs" whose leaders had been reporting to the Deputy Commissioner for Management:

1. Right to Read Program
2. Environmental Education Program
3. Health Nutrition Program/Drug Education
4. Arts and Humanities Program

In reaction to this first stab at reorganization, the Commissioner felt the best procedure would be to have the Deputy Commissioner for Development and his staff visit with each of the affected Deputies individually. Their task would be to talk through which programs should be switched and what, if any, problems could be pinpointed. After each of these meetings, the affected Deputy was to write a critique of the DCD recommendations and submit it to the Commissioner. The latter's responsibility would be to resolve any disputes that surfaced. As one might imagine, several did. Bureaucratic turf - as well as ideological and educational considerations - were at stake.

Some of the disputes were more equanimously resolved than others. For instance, Follow Through would stay in the Bureau of Elementary and Secondary Education because a decision had been pretty well made that, as a "demonstration program", it would be phased out in a few years after the conclusion of the demonstration period. Arts and Humanities, a small program with a special focus, would be transferred to the Office of Special Concerns, reporting directly to the Commissioner. There was little squabble about this because the program's mission was relatively divergent from what Renewal was all about.

Over the EPDA - Part E Program, a minor disagreement surfaced. Peter Muirhead, Acting Deputy Commissioner for Higher Education, argued that the program's orientation was inconsistent with Renewal. Whereas Renewal was a schools program, Part E was a higher-education program. Davies, of course, argued to the contrary: that the Part E Program dollars would be a fitting complement to the more school-oriented mission of the rest of the EPDA resources. When the argument ended, Muirhead had his way and Part E remained in the Higher Education bailiwick.

The plan to split the Bureau of Libraries and Educational Technology (BLET), leaving libraries and information services to the Deputy for Higher Education and giving the Technology Division to the Deputy for Development, caused a good deal of furor. The bulk of the reaction, however, came from a different source and was suggestive of a plethora of problems yet dimly perceived on Renewal's horizon. Whereas the Part E controversy remained largely internal to OE, the splitting of BLET did not. In the early fall of 1971, the National Audio-Visual Association

got wind of the proposed split and dispatched their highly effective lobbying arm to Congress to register their opposition.* N.A.V.A. represents both the big and small manufacturers and distributors of audio-visual equipment for schools. That there be a "critical mass" in the bureaucracy whose actions keep the demand for their tools high is essential to N.A.V.A. members' growth. To the extent that such a critical mass is threatened, so are they. Apparently their lobbying proved effective, because Senator Eagleton introduced, in the fall of 1971, an amendment** to the Higher Education Act, calling for the reinstatement of the educational technology division into its former resting-place.

Without doubt the two program switches that generated the most controversy - both inside and outside the Office - were those of the ESEA Title III Program and the ESEA Title VII Program, Bilingual Education. Before considering what happened on these two fronts, it might be helpful to relate events which intervened between the recommendation of their transfer in the late spring of 1971 and the flack over it which ensued in the fall.

In May, Davies and his staff made a presentation to the Secretary at one of the latter's periodic management conferences. Secretary Richardson reacted with emphatic enthusiasm. Essentially what Davies

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*The American Library Association was a leading force here, too.

**That amendment was later dropped by the House-Senate Conferees on the bill. Ironically, this controversy over the fractioning of BIET, although it led to the first wave of strong Congressional opposition, petered out by the end of the battle. Davies and other Administration figures would have wished the same fate for the other fusillades of Congressional opposition that were to come, but such was not to be the case.

conveyed were: strong reasons why previous reform efforts had not worked and why Renewal could; the way in which putting together consolidation at the federal level with reform centers at the local level would make a difference; the mutually supportive relationships that NIE and Renewal could have and that Educational Extension Agents and the local Renewal sites could have; the site selection and governance criteria that would be necessary for Renewal to work; and the amount of dollars and time it would take to have payoff on the matter of increased achievement for children from low-income homes.

The upshot of the meeting was a top-level go-ahead signal. Davies and his colleagues returned to OE to prepare a written reorganization plan - to get the internal resources to do the job. In August, that plan was conveyed to the Office of the Secretary for approval. It was not destined to gain approval until February 1972 - almost six months after submission. The long delay resulted from sheer ambivalence in the face of an expanding catalog of Congressional and constituency opposition in the summer and fall of 1971. And that ambivalence stemmed from, among other sources, the lack of a carefully-articulated strategy about how the agency was going to move in the political forum. At times it appeared that all was "go" and it was just a matter of time between planning and implementation. At other times - usually in reaction to an expression of opposition by Congress or an association - the turtle-like bureaucracy would retract its head and say "we're only in a planning phase; no one has said we're going to move ahead full steam."

As the fall wore on, the ambivalence worsened. The Commissioner and his Deputy for Development made several speeches to various groups

announcing the inception of the program.* But belligerent queries from Members of Congress or their staffs were dealt with by saying that Renewal was still just being planned, still essentially under wraps. Under these conditions it was difficult for the Office of the Secretary to grant approval of the reorganization. If they did that they would be on the firing line. As the seasoned inhabitant of the stark edifices on Independence Avenue has learned, it is always safer to be tentative. Naturally, the outcome of prolonged hesitation was further deterioration of the bureaucratic fabric of the new DCD. It is acknowledged administrative theory that reorganizations have to be executed quickly. If they are not, disgruntlement amongst those who are to be reorganized builds, and associated constituency pressures mount. The result, in very short order, is institutionalized opposition that is almost impossible to surmount.

So the turn of the wheel was complete. Tentativeness caused delay which caused disgruntlements which caused tentativeness, etc.

To return to an earlier issue, the transfer of the ESEA Title III and Title VII Programs are excellent examples of how the wheel spun. The Title III portion of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act was enacted in 1965. It provided for, among other things, "risk capital" for local districts, short-term funding to allow the districts

*In one of the more noteworthy of these addresses, the Commissioner announced to the Chief State School Officers at their annual convention held in Louisville, Kentucky in November: "---The renewal effort will impact directly on the lives of five and one-half million of the most deprived - and therefore the most educationally resistant - children in the United States over the next 14 years, with built-in performance goals for each child.--- The States, to begin with, will identify the renewal sites.---We could, I would guess, count on receiving 500 or 600 nominees for the initial 200 awards, with the final selections a matter of close examination and negotiation between your offices and mine."

to attempt innovation. Not too many years after enactment, serious concern arose in a number of quarters about the impact such seed money was having. The critics' contention was that the half-life of the innovations tried in the projects was coincident with the half-life of the Title III money; that is, the projects were having no impact on the larger systems in which they were set.

As a result of these concerns, a fair amount of tinkering with Title III ensued. The Central Cities Project was one effort at reform of the program. Another was a series of alterations in how the dollars would be distributed. In 1967, the money appropriated under the Title was rerouted as a result of a Congressional amendment sponsored by Representative Edith Green of Oregon. Instead of passing directly from USOE to the local districts, it would go from Washington to the state education agencies. They, in turn, would decide on local grant applications. In 1969 another change occurred. Congress voted that 85% would be passed from the USOE to the states, the latter to have de facto control over which districts would be funded; 15% would remain for USOE distribution to selected districts on a discretionary basis. At the time of this decision to split the resources, much discussion ensued in Congress on exactly how much would go to whom. Several key Senators wanted more, perhaps 25%, to remain in OE's control. Most states, of course, wanted 100%. A compromise was struck at 85 - 15. Even after the law was passed, however, the debate went on. The Title III Coordinators in each state and the State Title III Advisory Councils were continually applying pressure that would foster their interests. The National Title III Advisory Council was actively trying to protect the overall interests

of the program. The State Title III Office in OE was becoming increasingly autonomous of the unit concerned with administration of the Commissioner's 15% discretionary. Thus, at the time of the planned reorganization for Renewal, the Title III program itself was far from effectively and harmoniously administered.

On the first go-around concerning the reorganization, the Office of the Deputy Commissioner for Development had recommended that the entire Title III program be transferred from the Bureau of Elementary and Secondary Education. After some deliberation, however, Davies recognized that it would make little sense for the 85% to be incorporated into a unit whose whole mode of operation would be the awarding of grants by the federal government to local districts.* So plans were revised, leaving the 85% for BESE to administer, taking the 15% for DCD. This attempted Solomon's compromise was not to be, however.

The National Title III Advisory Council was rankled. For the same reasons that the National Audio-Visual Association got upset over the splitting of the Bureau of Libraries and Educational Technology, the Title III Council became deeply concerned about the threatened loss of bureaucratic "critical mass" deemed essential to the effectiveness of pressure-group politics.

The State Coordinators and the State Advisory Councils were rankled. They knew that if the 15% of Title III moved to another bureaucratic aegis there would be almost no chance of claiming it, their goal still being control over all the Title III monies.

*The notion that the state education agencies would be the nominators of local districts for Renewal grants had not become a firm part of the plan.

Inside the bureaucracy, several people were rankled. The leadership of the Bureau of Elementary and Secondary Education argued vehemently that the best course of action would be to leave all of the administration of Title III in the Bureau. Failing this, the next-best course - but a far second - would be to move the whole program. Perhaps the worst course of action, they argued, would be to split them. The reasons, in addition to the ones I have already cited, were typical. The Bureau people, particularly the leadership of the Division of Plans and Supplementary Centers where Title III was lodged, had been trying to keep the state Title III shop in tow. As mentioned, they were drifting from the fold, "doing their own thing". Splitting the part of the Division responsible for Title III would dash any chances of carving out any coherent, well-coordinated direction for Title III as a whole.

And finally, both inside and outside, there were several groups rankled for yet another reason. Moving any part of Title III to the newly-constituted Office of the Deputy Commissioner for Development would have meant applying Title III dollars almost exclusively to the problems of low-income people. This would have been a significant departure from the course those running Title III had pursued since 1965. Except for a few "lighthouse" projects for schools serving children from low-income families, Title III had for the most part concentrated its resources elsewhere, and the thought that the Title should also serve the poor brought out a host of counter-arguments and pressures.

The intensity of such reactions and the diversity of quarters from which they came were sufficient to cause apprehension on the part of Renewal's advocates. Add to these the span of time in which

opposition was allowed to fester - almost six months - and it is not too hard to understand why the screw kept turning on Renewal. Added to these factors, the Office of the Deputy Commissioner for Development did not handle an admittedly difficult situation very well. The professional staff of Title III first heard about their possible shift to DCD via the rumor mill. For an exceptionally long period, no responsible official conferred with them about what would happen and when. Finally, a list was posted in the Title III Offices, denoting the names of those to be transferred to DCD. In a staff already on pins and needles, this action evoked great anxieties and resistance.

Again: tentativeness, ambivalence and lack of definitive action extended through the bureaucracy from top to bottom, causing waves on the outside that further reinforced detrimental attitudes and behavior on the inside. Since the Office of the Secretary would not, or felt it could not, approve the OE reorganization, the leadership at OE, most particularly Davies, had to remain in limbo, half moving, half static. In the case of the Title III staff, the result was that they were not told anything official about their fate for three months. And as their frustration and anger continued to mount, they communicated more and more discontent to their "allies in the field". In turn, these constituencies beat a mean drum, writing letters, making phone calls and visits, increasing further the apprehension of anyone in the bureaucracy to take a definitive step. As we shall note, they also communicated their discontent directly to Congress.

Whatever impact the Title III controversy had on the fate of Renewal is dwarfed by that caused by the projected switch of the Title

VII program. Title VII found its way into law in 1967. Like most other pieces of Great Society legislation, it was categorical with a specific mission: to try to help the Spanish-speaking children of this country get a better shake from the schools. Almost from the moment of its passage it had a strong constituency behind it. As one official of the Bureau of Elementary and Secondary Education put it, "Title VII is the brown man's Title I".

Organizationally, those who worked on Title VII at the federal level were placed in the same Division as Title III, the Division of Plans and Supplementary Centers. Albar Pena had come to OE in 1968 to help set up the Bilingual Branch and in 1971 he was acting as its director. The program had funded well over a hundred bilingual education projects throughout the country, 26 in California alone. Most of the projects were in urban areas, a number in rural areas.

In mid-1971, when the notion surfaced of including Title VII in the newly-constituted Office of the Deputy Commissioner for Development, there was a series of outcries. The first came from within the bureaucracy itself. The leadership of the Bureau of Elementary and Secondary Education protested strongly, partly out of bureaucratic instinct: "one has to have the pieces to have the power". Part was out of a genuine concern for the political ramifications of switching Bilingual Education out of a unit where it had relative integrity and autonomy to a unit where these would be threatened by the folding of the program into the all-purpose Renewal site effort. With this last concern the leadership of the Bilingual Branch concurred heartily.

Despite arguments to the contrary, the Office of the Deputy Commissioner moved ahead with the transfer. As with Title III, the new home for Title VII was to be the newly-named National Center for the Improvement of Educational Systems (formerly the Bureau of Educational Personnel Development). The leadership of DCD and NCIES, in preparation for the country-wide Renewal effort, had decided to reorganize the National Center along geographical lines. Instead of the old Division of School Programs, College Programs, etc., there would be a Northeast Division, Southeast Division, Northwest Division, and Southwest Division. Title III, it was planned, would be segmented into all four of the new divisions. Title VII, however, would become part of the Southwest Division. To this prospect the Bilingual Education leadership reacted with vigorous dissent. They argued that the Spanish-speaking people in this country were not confined to the Southwest region. After all, there was a substantial population of Puerto Ricans in the northeast, Cubans in Florida, etc. If anything, they said, Title VII should be a division alongside the other four in the bureau.

To make matters worse - in these ethnically sensitive times - the head of NCIES, William Smith, just happened to be a black, which meant that a "brown man's program" could be alleged to be "subjected" to black control. Given a touchy competitiveness between blacks and Chicanos, a tender situation became a raw one. Further, it was rumored that the DCD/NCIES leadership was considering replacing the head of the Bilingual program with another person on the staff of the Deputy Commissioner. This person, although Spanish-speaking, was a lawyer

and not an educator. As a non-member of the "club" - an unknown quantity - he was feared.

The result of all these fears and feelings was that the OE Bilingual staff - fearing for their programmatic lives - communicated their fears to the outside world, specifically to people working in Bilingual projects across the country. These people quickly took up arms. Davies, in an attempt to confront the opposition head-on, arranged for a series of regional meetings, first in Texas, then in New York and, finally, in California. This last proved to be the toughest of all. By the time Davies arrived, the staff of the 26 Bilingual Education projects and other Chicanos had already put together an ad hoc organization for the defense of Bilingual Education, the "California Delegation on Bilingual Education". They knew that there would be a very limited number of Renewal sites in California - maybe only four the first year. And if Bilingual Education was subsumed in Renewal the existence of most of the existing twenty-six projects would be manifestly endangered. The meeting in California was less than cordial; 400 to 500 questioners bombarded Davies with opposition and hostility.

Not only was the furor communicated to the field, but it was also very effectively communicated to Congress. And such communication was not restricted to field-to-Congress contacts but included agency-to-Congress contacts as well. By February, 1972, the heat had become so great that an amendment was introduced to the Higher Education Act by Senator Alan Cranston of California. Among other things, the amendment called for the reinstatement of the Bilingual Program in the Bureau of Elementary and Secondary Education.

On the Cranston amendment more will be said later, for it included also the provision referred to in the Overview , forbidding the Administration to consolidate programs or commingle funds without legislative approval. It should be said here, however, that the reinstatement clause of the Amendment was removed before the Act was passed. By the time of the bill's passage the clause was superfluous. OE's leadership had acquiesced to Senator Cranston's amendment, one of their many compromises to try to save Renewal: the Title VII Program was elevated to the status of division from that of branch and returned to the Bureau of Elementary and Secondary Education!

Planning, or collecting thoughts along the way

Before proceeding with commentary on the fight over Educational Renewal, we should return again to the late spring of 1971 and reflect on the nature of the substantive planning that went into Renewal, with particular reference to the impact of certain events on that planning.

As already noted, planning for Renewal began with discussions between Don Davies, Russ Wood and Mary Hoag, and with attempts by Wood to put into writing what Renewal was about. Those early documents, although meant for internal use only, reflect a heavy emphasis on managerial matters - which units were to be transferred to the new Deputyship and what resources they would bring with them. They touch only lightly on how National Education Renewal Centers were to operate. For this early emphasis there are several possible explanations. Either the planners felt the rearrangement issues were paramount, or they felt

that the real substantive planning of how Renewal Centers would work at the local level had already been done and they did not need to repeat it. Evidence exists to support both explanations, given the predilections of the key figures involved and their sense that the experience of BEPD programs served as sufficient precedent for an immediate go-ahead with Renewal. Whether either of the explanations represented intelligent assessments on the part of the planners is another matter.

Although reorganization of the pieces at the federal level was essential - and without such a move there could be no Renewal effort at the local level - this does not diminish by one iota the importance of depicting as clearly as possible what Renewal was to be. I do not mean laying out all the fine points. That would be impossible, particularly since people in the local districts were to play a determining role in designing and carrying out programs. What was needed was a forthright portrayal of the parameters of Renewal, the broad brushstrokes, if you will. The intent of such a portrayal would be to:

1. Put forth the ideas central to making Renewal work.
2. Display the assumptions buttressing these ideas, be the assumptions empirically verifiable or not.
3. Separate clearly these central ideas from the components of Renewal that were negotiable, manipulable, open to review by insiders and outsiders alike.

The notion of the parity council is a good example for examining the point at issue. The council was to be the main decision-making body for activities at the Renewal site. As such it was to be composed of representatives from almost every constituency concerned

with education in a given community. School administrators, teachers, parents, students, university people would all serve. The idea behind the establishing of such a council was to afford a diversity of "producers" and "consumers" a strong voice in how an educational system would work. The assumption behind the idea was that real participation by affected parties would improve the system. And this idea, in its unembellished form, was essentially "non-negotiable"; its essence could not be compromised without forsaking much of the intellectual power of the whole Renewal idea. In contrast, many of the details were negotiable: for instance, who was to be on the council, how they were to be chosen, what legal powers the council would have, what powers it would not have, etc.

This sort of portrayal and analysis of the key ideas of Renewal was never performed. The ideas were never succinctly outlined, the underlying assumptions never put out front, the differentiation between what was and what was not negotiable was never made clear. As a result, Renewal was more of a muddle than a careful design. Viewers could not pick up much more than vague notions, and had little sense of what lay behind the notions. Further, they had an exceptionally hard time discerning which elements were "untouchable basics", which were not.

In all fairness, though, the need for careful design and articulation was not absent from the minds of the DCD leadership - even though the evidence might contradict this. In spring, 1971, Davies formulated plans for a high-level centralized planning unit in his Office. Quite early in the Renewal episode he set about trying

to recruit capable outsiders and to redirect capable insiders to such a unit. Regrettably, he was not as successful in this endeavor as he would have wished. Moreover, when the unit finally did come together it was not too long before it became mired in the required paper exchanges that dominate a federal bureaucracy's planning process. "Five-year plans", "descriptions of accomplishments in the past fiscal year", "next year's strategies" - all had to be written and passed on to the appropriate higher offices for clearance. In the face of such a tidal wave there was little chance of any good substantive planning.

It is possible to argue, too, that by the time the need for sound planning was recognized and action was taken to make way for it, it was much too late. The politics of Renewal became so intense so quickly that planning - perhaps even clear thinking - fell by the wayside. Rather than agent, the planning staff became victim.

The events that substantiate this contention are numerous. When Davies first broached the Renewal effort to his bureau directors (BEPD, NCES, NCEC, NCERD) in May 1971, he did not receive the unqualified support he sought. One touchy spot, for instance, was the National Center for Educational Communications. This group had been working for several years on the development of the Education Extension Agent concept. They had tried it in several states, allegedly with a good deal of success. For this and other reasons, they were protective of the idea and concerned that it would lose its "shine" if incorporated into the larger Renewal effort. These apprehensions persisted through the fall of 1971 and into 1972.

'Although the NCEC leadership nominally went along with the Renewal notion, their ambivalence - about whether the Extension Agents should be in or out of Educational Renewal - took its toll on the coherence of the Renewal effort. Planning under such circumstances was a precarious activity. Not knowing from day to day which pieces would be in the fold made it difficult to argue in any convincing way that the totality really made sense.

The National Center for Educational Statistics presented another kind of dilemma. Here the issue was not one of will, that is, whether or not they wanted to join the club. Rather, the question was whether they had the right characteristics to be a member. Their job is to design, conduct and report surveys on a panoply of educational concerns. To do this they use their own staff expertise and that of a host of contractors. Here, too, exactly how the NCES would relate to Renewal was never clear and, given the somewhat divergent missions of the two, it never could be. But the raising of the question and the attempt by Renewal's planners to address it further confounded an already overburdened planning process.

Beside developments in the bureaucracy that detracted from the possibility of good planning, there were pressures applied from the outside that further reduced the prospects.

The role played by the Council of Chief State School Officers is a case in point. First alerted to Davies' plans for Renewal in the spring of 1971, they argued that the plans would not work unless the Chiefs were integrally involved. Apparently, in the early set of plans they

were not. Reacting to the Council's pressure, Davies and his staff redrew their specifications in such a way that the Chiefs in each state would nominate the recipients of Renewal grants. Later, after OE's General Counsel reviewed the procedures to be used in Renewal, this stimpulation had to be altered. The U.S. Commissioner, under the appropriate legislative authorities, could not abdicate his discretionary powers of selection. At a speech made in Atlantic City in February, he said that revised plans called for the Chiefs being granted less than total control over grantee selection.

This one example, illustrative of a number that occurred, points to the difficulties into which Renewal planning had fallen. Several constituent groups, of which the Chiefs were one, were made privy to the unformed plans of Renewal quite early in the game. The intent was to open up the planning process and allow the "consumers" a strong say in program design. A noble aim, but the timing was poor and the preparation worse. Not having laid the few elemental ideas on the table, not having stated the assumptions behind the ideas, and not having delineated the non-negotiables from the negotiables, the agency was acting much too prematurely. It really had little sense of what it wanted from a given constituent group; in turn, the constituent group had little sense of what it was being asked and why. The constituents were wary: in previous instances they had been solicited for "advice" but had soon learned that they were really being asked for approval of a fait accompli.

At its worst, the scene works out something like this. A constituent group, typically skeptical about a government agency's honestly

asking them for substantive input, nonetheless gives it. The agency, never having articulated too clearly the basics of what it is about, alters course along the line of the group's suggestion. The constituent group reacts, "These guys obviously don't know what they're doing. They keep altering the fundamental groundrules. It sounds as if they're lying to us." A variant on this scne occurs when the agency fails to adopt the direction suggested by the group. The reaction is, "Why did they ask us if they weren't going to use our ideas?"

In other words, Davies had created for himself a no-win situation. Given the normal expectations of a constituent group vis à vis a federal agency and the failure of Renewal's planners to do the groundwork necessary for an open planning process to work, the effort was doomed. Rather than maximizing the capacity of outsiders to be helpful, the tactic led to an almost inevitable destructiveness.

In effect, then, planning for Renewal was a near picture-perfect demonstration of how the substantive and the political can be intermingled in a most detrimental way. The cause of substantive planning cannot be served by the untimely and uncircumspect intrusion of a political forum. The cause of political acceptance cannot be served by the intrusion of partially elaborated ideas.

Such intermingling got worse rather than better as the Renewal episode wore on. It almost had to. Around November the decision was made to set up a series of task forces composed of different kinds of outsiders. The first was a Chief State School Officers' Task Force; the next a Classroom Teachers' Task Force. Others followed: Higher Education Task Force, Community Task Force, Administration and

Supervision Task Force. The mandate of these groups was to aid in the planning for Renewal and to serve as "response mechanisms" for ideas generated in the agency. Apparently their political and substantive missions were melded together; nobody seemed terribly concerned about which was which.

Also in the fall, several internal agency task forces were set up to try to put some meat on the bones of Renewal. Five such groups were formed, composed of representatives from DCD, other OE Deputyships and, in a few cases, Office of the Secretary personnel. A "Management and Coordination" Task Force was to oversee the operations of the other four: "Program and Resource Analysis", "Site Planning", "Site Selection" and "Evaluation".

The available evidence showed that these task forces tried valiantly but did little. Overly "representative" and therefore in many instances too large, they floundered. Added to this, there was sufficient confusion about what their task was, even what Renewal was, and sufficient resentment over the organizational and operational changes Renewal had wrought to make the chances for their coming up with much rather slim. By the time they got themselves together it was too late anyway. If Renewal was going to be pulled out, it would not be because these five groups produced excellent documents. By the fall, the determining action was in the political forum, and if the members of the task forces did not <u>know</u> this, at least they <u>sensed</u> it, and acted accordingly.

An astute and informed observer might be compelled to ask what

role the planning staffs in OE and the Office of the Secretary played. After all, both units, OE and the Office of the Secretary, had well-established staffs whose responsibility was to perform or coordinate performance of planning and evaluation activities in the agency.

Unfortunately, in my view, as is true of most sub-units in bureaucracy, the Office of Planning, Budgeting and Evaluation (OPBE) in OE and its counterpart in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation (ASPE) have assumed a sort of independent raison d'être. They are much more concerned with an ethic and a set of operations inter alia than they are with fostering the development of agency programs.

In the case of OPBE, their role is to be relatively critical of program people's efforts, relatively uncreative about how those efforts might be improved. The vehicles for their criticism are the elaborate planning documents which program people must complete and, of course, the budget itself. A good example of the point here is an OPBE staffer's response to my question about the quality of planning for Renewal: "Sloppy", the person remarked. When pressed for clarification, it turned out that he was referring to the manner in which a particular OPBE document had been completed, not to the quality of the planning per se.

In the case of ASPE perhaps less of what I have observed applies, but not much less. They too are a semi-autonomous unit, more wont to oppose than to foster, more involved in their often unhinged solutions to society's problems than in the tremendously difficult task of substantiating what their boss thinks is a meritable notion. What mollifies my criticism of them is that they did offer some manifest assistance on

Renewal, through the articulation of one or two ideas and perspectives. For instance, they offered Davies the outline of a marketing or dissemination strategy which could have been used as a conceptual basis for Renewal. But ASPE is even more removed from the action of program development than OPBE and therefore less likely to have the time to jump into a planning effort on something like Renewal.

Regardless of the built-in failures of the broader bureaucratic "system" in which Renewal planning was taking place, the ultimate responsibility for that planning lay in only one place, the Office of the Deputy Commissioner for Development. And from there the necessary broad outlines, solidly delineated, never emerged. In the case of Renewal, this failure proved doubly devastating. Because of the nature of the "beast", more process or policy than program, the statements which DCD made about Renewal were subject to a number of different kinds of interpretation. Essentially, not only did the designers do a poor job of planning Renewal but they did an even worse job of planning for different people's reactions to such a notion.

Renewal was, in effect, a half-painted canvas displayed to the public; anyone who wished to could pick up a brush and complete the canvas as he chose. Some painted the rest of the picture so that the Renewal effort came out looking like a managerial exercise and not much more; if you will, a more efficient and effective way of "doling out the dough". Some, however, saw different images, and they completed the canvas accordingly. What stood out from their work were the philosophical gestures: for instance, letting the locals decide what their

problems were and what resources should be brought to bear on them. Yet others felt the essence of Renewal lay elsewhere. They painted the canvas so that it reflected more than anything else the workings of the Teacher Center and the Extension Agents. Their vision, more than logistical or philosophical, included the socio-psychological. So in their lines they depicted the winds of social change at work.

These levels of perception - there were probably others - were outcomes of the relatively poor articulation of Renewal from the start and the failure of Renewal's planners to anticipate objections and diverse views and to try to orchestrate them. For every complex notion, of which Renewal is an example, there will be levels of perception on the part of those who are asked to react. The point is that it is the duty of good planners to know this and to build strategies that exert some control on outcomes.

Matters of effective planning aside, however, the crucial forum for Renewal, as we shall see, was the political, not the conceptual. And it is to an exploration of activities in that forum that the paper now turns.

The legislature grinds Renewal to a halt

The first knowledge that anyone on Capitol Hill had of the Office of Education's plans for Renewal was via the "underground telegraph". This conduit operates regularly between the monolithic edifices on Independence Avenue and the imposing structure which overlooks them from a nearby knoll. The content which passes through the

conduit is a combination of verbal messages and documents on almost any issue of import. In the case of Renewal, a "leaked" document - probably one of the statements paraphrased earlier in this paper - reached the Congressional staff on the Hill before it reached some of its addressees in the bureaucracy.

The initial reaction of the Congressional staffers was a combination of confusion and consternation - not a rare reaction, by any means, to an Administration initiative. They really did know what it all meant, but they were characteristically suspicious and incipiently hostile. The roots of these feelings are important to an understanding of what was to occur in the Congressional arena. So it is worth developing some background.

First there was the growing sense on the part of Congressional members and staff that the Administration had evinced a blatant lack of understanding of how the United States constitutional system works. More specifically, they felt strongly that, from the White House on down, officials had shown little respect for the legitimate role of the Congress, that the attitudes and actions of the Administration evidenced a reckless disregard for their investiture as law-makers. Coupled with this lack of understanding was an alleged ineptitude on the part of Administration officials at operating effectively in the Congressional forum; they weren't perceived - often in the bureaucracy as well as in the Congress - as knowing how to deal there.

Second, there had been a rather long-standing and growing disagreement between the Congress and the Office of Education about the latter's use of Congressional authority. In several instances, some

already documented, key Congressional elements felt that OE had overstepped legitimate bounds in its capacity as executor of laws. The 1968 fray over packaging of ESEA programs was a glaring example. But there was a plethora of others. Much antagonism, for instance, had been generated by the Office of Education's administration of the Cooperative Research Act. Certain members of Congress argued vehemently that the Office was not using monies appropriated under the Act for purposes intended by Congress. It was, they said, properly an act to foster research efforts, while OE was using it instead as a "slush fund". Any "pet project", research-related or not, for which the Office could not find resources elsewhere was funded out of the Cooperative Research Act. All in all, then, an increasingly fierce tug of war between the education-related committees in Congress and the associated administrative unit downtown, USOE, was clearly in the making even before the advent of the Renewal notion.

The administration of the Education Professions Development Act was no exception to this tenor of relations. Davies, so the Congressional side of the argument went, consistently ignored the intent of Congress in his execution of the EPDA. His treatment of the Teacher Corps, supported under Part B of that Act, was a good example. Congress had displayed clear intent that the Teacher Corps was to have high visibility in the bureaucratic structure, and it was to have ample resources to accomplish its mission. During Davies' administration both intents were continually contravened, they argued; Davies had submerged the administration of the Corps in the bureaucratic structure and commandeered its resources to underwrite other programs.

When the EPDA was passed, say key Congressional staff, the intent was to improve the quality of the education professions, that is, to recruit people for pressing needs and to provide them with sound training. The prime vehicle was to be well-developed programs in institutions of higher education. The intent was not to direct monies to the low-income sectors of society and to support efforts mounted by the local school districts, however admirable these aims might be. Davies, the charge goes, did both of these and thereby failed to honor the Congressional intent underlying the EPDA.

A further ingredient of the mix was that the Senate had a particular axe to grind on the matter of how EPDA was administered. When the law was passed in 1967, conditions were such that the Senate was forced to accept unamended the House version of the Act if it wanted it to pass in the then-current session and thus to save the expiring Teacher Corps. Senators, such as Wayne Morse, who had a heavy stake in the training provisions of the National Defense Education Act of 1958 and those of the Higher Education Act of 1965, were somewhat smitten in that they had little input into the EPDA. But because they, and a hard-driving President Johnson, wanted to save the Teacher Corps, the Senate went along with what was essentially the House version. In the time which followed and which was, to their eye, characterized by reckless use of discretion by the BEPD, they recalled their legislative surrender in 1967 and they bristled. The upshot was that the Senate, even more than the House, was ready to come down hard in an oversight capacity. This was one way of compensating for their missing the action at the point that authority had been granted.

In addition to these larger causes for the ballooning of antagonism over the administration of the EPDA, there was a relatively small one: the Davies-developed programs in BEPD were organized generically, rather than by mission. The names "Career Opportunities Program" and "Urban-Rural" were supposed to address a multitude of sins, rather than one shortcoming such as "the drug problem in the schools". As a result, it was difficult for Congressional staff and outside groups to garner a quick sense of what BEPD was about. This lack of visible, readily identifiable pieces, coupled with the absence of much literature about the programs, irritated Congress. It was difficult to send constituents information on a program they had supported. Embarrassment bred resentment and retaliation.

A fair question in response to the litany just recited is: how did BEPD "get away" with all these indiscretions? A reasonable explanation is that BEPD was not a highly visible operation in the bureaucracy. It was one unit amongst many with one legislative authority behind it. In other words, it had the capacity to "hide" in some critical instances. Granted, it was a new program and Congress and outsiders alike were interested in its development. But it was not nearly as visible a piece as an Office for Development. At this level, one was second from the top and numerous legislative authorities were involved in one "Grand Empire". One of the by-products of a relatively lower-level existence is that Bureau-Congressional relations could be conducted on a somewhat informal basis. A few phone calls and a couple of lunches could resolve disputes, whereas in the case of an operation like DCD, formal contacts between OE and Congress were the order of the day. The Agency's legislative support staff had to be included on every visit.

So the reaction of Congressional Members and staff to this "Renewal Idea" in the spring of 1971 was understandable. "What is OE up to now?" More particularly, "What is Davies up to now?" But since nothing had yet occurred to prompt direct Congressional concern, they adopted a wait-see stance. Then came the agency's decision not to go for legislation, to which the Congressional staffs reacted with marked disbelief. But there were still no action-pressing events, and both the Senate and House subcommittees were deeply immersed in the time-consuming consideration of the Higher Education Act.

Perhaps the first event which caused manifest concern in the Congress took place in June. Davies visited selected Members of the Senate Subcommittee on Education to persuade them to consider extending the life of the Cooperative Research Act and to put more money into it. The assumption of Subcommittee Members and staff had been that renewal of the Act was not warranted and that it should lapse. Their reaction was that Davies was up to no good - increasing the "slush fund" for some dubious purposes. "Probably this Renewal thing", they opined.

Then came the OE decision on reorganization in August, and along with it increasing cause for concern on the part of Congress. Constituencies, such as those concerned with Bilingual Education and Educational Technology, were beginning to protest, and Senators and Representatives began to "feel the heat". In October, Commissioner Marland went to the Hill for the first time to explain Renewal. His presentation was less than well-accepted by members of the Senate Education Subcommittee. The Committee began to map its opposition strategy, bolstered by a constant

stream of up-to-date information and negative sentiment on Renewal from within the bureaucracy and by an apathetic or increasingly negative response on the part of a variety of constituents.

The education associations, particularly the Big Six*, passed affirmative resolutions on behalf of Renewal in the fall, but they were not about to unleash their lobbyists on the members of Congress to get the to support it. Their position seemed to be to remain cool, wait on the sidelines and see what happens. Without mincing words, the basic reason for this relative neutrality was that there appeared to be little or no new money in Renewal. To them, Renewal seemed just a rearrangement of already-existing blocks of money. Given the associations' prime interests, there was little incentive to support such an effort. A corollary reason was that Renewal without benefit of legislation was like a young executive with a dubious future. Legislation offers a degree of promise and permanency which bureaucratic decree cannot. Why should the associations support an endeavor when they have been around long enough to know that the next Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner, or the next Administration, whichever occurs first, could wipe it out with the stroke of a memo?

Even the Council of Chief State School Officers, whose interests Renewal seemed to serve - because the Chiefs were to do the nominating of sites - were not beating down Congress' doors in support of Renewal.

*The Big Six includes the National Education Association, American Association of School Administrators, Council of Chief State School Officers, National Congress of Parents and Teachers, National Association of State Boards of Education, and National School Boards Association.

In their view, there were still too many unresolved substantive questions about how the idea would work for them to be active supporters. Furthermore, the lack of new money and lack of a legislative stamp made them extremely nervous about jumping in with active support. Finally, the Council, a staunch advocate of maintaining the states' say in educational affairs, came to regard Renewal as yet another attempt by the "Feds" to impose a program on the states and local districts. In other words, they did not trust OE when the lacter said that the program content would be locally determined. Nor, in some instances, did the Chiefs care to enhance local at the expense of state prerogatives.

Much the same was true of the Council of Great City Schools, even though most of its constituents, 23 of the largest school districts, potentially stood to gain by Renewal. The Council demurred on outright support for a number of reasons. First, they were worried that the site selection procedures being developed by Renewal's planners might result in several of their constituent districts' being by-passed. In California, for instance, if there were to be only two urban and two rural sites the first year, several of California's major cities would not be included. Second, the notion of the Extension Agents was not viewed by the Council with great favor. Apparently, they saw the Agents as "carpetbaggers" from Washington who would "get in the hair" of the local schools' leadership. Third, the parity council made them nervous because they saw it as detracting from the legitimate functions of the Superintendents and School Boards. Last, the pot of dollars was too small and looked as if it would not be sweetened.

The reaction of the National School Boards Association, another potential supporter, was much along the lines as that of the Council of Chief State School Officers and the Council of Great City Schools. The academic community, another major constituency with potential for impact on Congressional action, offered little support for Renewal. They saw it as a further move on the part of the federal government away from university training for people in the education professions. For the most part, however, they were retiring in their treatment of the issue. Groups such as the American Association of Colleges of Teacher Education registered weak opposition and adopted the characteristic wait-see attitude. Only one institution of higher education, Harvard's School of Education, stormed the bureaucracy in opposition to what they saw as a "brainless proposal" and one designed to emasculate the universities. Theodore Sizer, then Dean of the School, led the charge during several personal visits to Washington.

The stage was fairly well set, then, for the Congress to enter the fray. Almost every major association was sitting on the sidelines. There were indications of strong opposition from within the bureaucracy, including that part of it which was to be geared up for, and replaced by, Renewal. There were signs of increasing opposition from the field, particularly from those who ran Bilingual Education projects. If Congress decided to act, it could assume that there would be little backlash from any quarter. They had, in other words, everything going for them.

In the final months of 1971 Congress quickened the pace of its

opposition. A series of queries to USOE shot forth from Senator Claiborne Pell, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Education. They called for a clarification of the Commissioner's plans on Renewal and demanded a clear justification of the agency's authority to proceed with those plans. The Commissioner replied to those queries, but his answers only laid the ground for further questions from the Chairman. In January and February of 1972 the volley continued; the letters got longer, the misunderstanding deeper and the consequent acrimony greater. Then, in February, the House got into the act, in close staff collaboration with the Senate Subcommittee. A long list of questions arrived from Representative John Brademus, Chairman of the House Select Subcommittee on Education. A 27-page letter was drafted and sent in reply.

The exchange of letters makes interesting reading in the Congressional Record of February 28, 1972. But more important than the details discussed in the letters was the general point that the Congress was questioning the authority of the Executive Branch to initiate Renewal without benefit of legislative consideration and approval. This general concern was manifested in a multitude of detailed questions about what Renewal was, how it would operate, how big it was going to be next year and in subsequent years, how the various legislative authorities would be used to foster it, how the various Office of Education bureaus and programs would participate in it, how it would relate to the National Institute of Education and the National Foundation for Higher Education, how it differed from Revenue Sharing, etc., etc., etc. But the recurring theme was always the assertion that the

Administration had overstepped the bounds of legitimate authority.

The crescendo of such activity was reached on the last day of February 1972, the final day on which substantive input could be made by Senators to the Higher Education Act before it went to Conference. In introducing his amendment, Senator Cranston said, "Mr. President, the amendment I offer is designed to clear up a very confusing and unnecessarily complicated situation which has developed in the Office of Education in the past 5 or 6 months".

Basically, the amendment did three things:

1. It restored the Bilingual Education Program to its former bureaucratic setting and provided, for the first time, specific legislative authority for the Right to Read Program.
2. It granted authorization to Renewal on a pilot or experimental basis.
3. It forbade the consolidation of programs or commingling of funds without prior legislative approval.

The jockeying which took place around the introduction of the amendment was intense and warrants treatment. First, it appears that the Cranston amendment was not Cranston's, but Senator Pell's, drafted by his counsel, Richard Smith. But because Pell was the floor manager of the Bill, it would have been contrary to protocol for him to introduce an amendment to it. So a proponent had to be found, and Cranston was a more than willing one. As one of California's senators, he had been badgered in the days prior to February 28 by several of his constituents.

Some were upset about the fate of the Bilingual Program and some about the possibility of their school system's being excluded from the Renewal program. In all, there was enough flack to make him concerned about Renewal and prepared to oppose it on the floor of the Senate.

Second, on the morning of the day the amendment was introduced there had been a lengthy discussion between Secretary Richardson and the Senator from California. Richardson's purpose was to urge the Senator not to introduce the amendment; failing that, to get assurance that its disabling clauses would be tempered or removed if USOE could give assurances that the Renewal issue would be cleared up and legislative intent fully respected. As the presence of the amendment testifies, the Secretary had to accept the latter alternative.

The introduction of the Cranston amendment proved to be a watershed in the story of Renewal. It was the first definitive, undeniable statement that the Congress meant business. All the letters between Commissioner Marland and Senator Pell, between the Commissioner and Representative Brademas and the verbal exchanges between the Office of Education and the Hill faded into the background with the realization that potentially disabling legislation was headed for the statute books. Second, the amendment's introduction marked that point in time when the Executive Branch "upped the stakes". Prior to the introduction of the amendment, Marland had been handling relations with Congress on the matter of Renewal; he had been signing the letters, appearing at hearings, participating in the verbal give-and-takes. Following the amendment the Secretary stepped directly into the fray and took responsibility for agency-Congress relations on Renewal.

Such a move was understandable. The Office of the Secretary had a great philosophical investment in Renewal. It was a prime example of the kind of thing Richardson had been attempting to accomplish at HEW: a more rational allocation of resources, a more substantial decision-making role for the recipients of federal dollars. In effect, defending Renewal was a matter of high principle for HEW. In addition, it was obvious that the relationship between the Commissioner and Congress had deteriorated to a serious level. The very credibility of an executive agency's leadership was being questioned, and its capacity to be effective under such circumstances was limited.

Albeit understandable, the move turned out to be an inadvisable one, for it gave the Congress a more highly-placed foe to whom it could make the point it wished. And one reason it was able to do this was that this foe, by necessity and circumstance, was inevitably less prepared to fend off the opposition than someone closer to the Renewal endeavor might have been.

To continue the story, although Richardson left his February 28 meeting with Cranston feeling that he had been given assurances that the more disabling portions of the amendment would disappear in the conference between the House and Senate if he was able to prove his good faith, such was not to be the case. The intent of key Congressional Members and staff, before and after the Cranston amendment, was to kill Renewal, and this is exactly what they set out to do.*

*Whether Cranston knew this I do not know, but I would wager he did not. For, after all, he was really just acting as a conduit for others' designs.

In the Senate-House Conference which followed on the Higher Education Act, now called Education Amendments of 1972, the fate of Renewal was sealed. Congressman Brademas, a Democrat who had become the prime champion of the establishment of the NIE, an Administration-sponsored measure, felt strongly that Renewal had to go. He believed that the initiative posed a threat to the legitimate power of the legislature to legislate and he was determined to make the death of Renewal stand as a monument (or rather a tombstone) to that belief.

At a more programmatic level, Brademas viewed Renewal as a direct threat to the NIE. Renewal's advocates had argued that the dissemination functions of the Office of Education, housed in the National Center for Educational Communications, were rightfully part of Renewal. Brademas saw it exactly the other way around - that if NIE was to do anything useful on the research and development front, it had to have dissemination capacity, a way to spread the good ideas it would come up with.

For these reasons, he and the Republican leadership of the House Education Committee agreed to oppose Renewal. Representative Quie, although the ranking Republican, was more than willing to join his Democratic colleagues. He, like other members of his party in Congress, had been angered by the Administration's refusal to share an initiative with their allies on the Hill. HEW's assertion that it already had the authority to launch Renewal was interpreted as a direct assault on Republicans who had hoped for a creative partnership with "their" Administration. What better to do than to return the favor? Quie also did not view with favor the notion of a "horde" of Educational Extension

Agents spread out across the country. Whether mistakenly or not, he saw them as Washington's agents, and to that he was philosophically opposed.

The final demise of Renewal came in the usual way - via a compromise. Brademas agreed to let the Cooperative Research Act, with a dollar level ceiling and a limited life of three years, stay under OE's wing, that is, not go to NIE, if Renewal would not be authorized in any shape, manner or form. So the Education Amendments of 1972 became the law of the land. Every vestige of Renewal was erased, but the provision 421-C remained: no consolidation of programs or commingling of funds without prior legislative authority. As a final gesture, Congress requested that the Executive Branch come forward, if it chose, with a legislative proposal on Renewal. The gesture promised "speedy consideration".

Much of what has been described so far in this section concentrates on the legislative side of the story, the reactions of Members and their staff to what the Executive agency was proposing. But there is, of course, another side to the story: what was happening in the agency in response to the accelerating opposition of Congress. As already noted, the main responsibility for Executive-Legislative relations rests with the legislative support staffs in the agencies. In the case of HEW's Office of the Secretary, there is an Assistant Secretary for Legislation and his staff; in the case of the Office of Education, a Deputy Commissioner for External Relations and his staff. Their purposes are to maintain open channels of communication between the agency and Congress and to act as advocates on the Hill of Administration proposals. I would venture that in the case of Renewal they did neither particularly well.

Earlier the assertion was made that OE's leadership - Marland, Davies and Saunders, Deputy Commissioner for External Relations - left the Airlie House meeting in April, 1971, having decided not to seek legislation on Renewal but also neglecting to formulate any sort of legislative strategy. The result was that when legislative opposition began to register the agency was thrust into a totally defensive stance. The question became "what to do next, now that such-and-such has happened?" The answer all too often seemed to be "we'll go up to the Hill and tell them what good guys we are and everything will be all right."

My sense of what happened is that the legislative support staffs had only a crude understanding of what Renewal was and this, more than anything else, made them particularly ill-suited to "sell" it. There are, of course, understandable reasons for their failure to comprehend. First, even if presented with maximum lucidity, Renewal was a complicated idea and one that was hard to grasp. Second, as we have seen, Renewal was not presented with anything like maximum lucidity. Third, the legislative support staff has to "handle" a host of programs and cannot be expected to incorporate them all. This was particularly true at the time Renewal came to the fore. The legislative people in the agency were overburdened with concern over the components of the Higher Education Act. There was little time to digest Renewal, much less to sell it. But understanding the plight of these hard-working folk does little to diminish the outcome: poor communication of an Administration program.

Further malfunctioning in the legislative support operation was amply demonstrated by the Renewal episode. What was clearly enunciated

and understood opposition on the Hill was translated into a recommendation of compromise in the agency. The legislative support staff heard and understood what legislators and staff were saying about Renewal during the late fall of 1971 and winter and spring of 1972. Congressional people were so open about it: "they were going to kill Renewal". In the journey from Capitol Hill to HEW, a distance of a few blocks, the message was transformed into: all we need to do is compromise by letting them have their way on Bilingual or by reducing the number of Renewal sites to be established the first year and we can save the essence of the program from extinction. So the principals in the agency compromised; in fact, they compromised to the point that the authorities to be included in the Renewal effort were at the end only three: the Cooperative Research Act; the Education Professions Development Act, Part D; and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, Title III (Section 306 - the 15 percent). Yet after all their compromising, the program still met its demise.

Exactly what prompted this sort of behavior on the part of the legislative aides is not clear. One perspective is that excessive contact with legislators can cause distortions in an aide's view of his role. It is all too easy in the heat of action on the Hill for him to lose sight of his primary mission - advocacy of Administration measures and clear two-way communication between agency and Hill - and to begin to see himself as "policy-maker in the middle" or "thinker on the run" capable of doing the fine tuning necessary to win approval for a given initiative.

Like the Office of Planning, Budgeting and Evaluation in OE and the

Assistant Secretary's Office for Planning and Evaluation, the Deputy Commissioner's Office for External Relations and the Assistant Secretary's Office for Legislation were interposed between the creation of ideas and their fulfillment. In the case of the former two they existed (supposedly) to facilitate conceptual development and substantiation. In the case of the latter two they existed (supposedly) to facilitate the communication and selling of concepts. It is questionable whether these latter fulfilled their mission in the matter of Educational Renewal.

V. IN SUM, WHY RENEWAL FAILED

Renewal failed because the engines of the bureaucracy malfunctioned. Planning was inadequate. Communication with Congress and the outside world was poor. At one point during the long letter-writing siege between Congress and USOE it surfaced that the very word "Renewal" was subject to four completely different definitions: 1) OE's total effort to reform education; 2) the consolidation of OE's project grant programs; 3) the activities proposed at the local Renewal sites; and 4) the budget entry by the Office of Management and Budget, which spanned all the programs under the DCD aegis. Since each definition had different implications and incurred divergent reactions, neither the cause of substantive planning nor that of effective communications was served.

Thus the bureaucracy's leadership, instead of having their ideas successfully elaborated and sold, found themselves in a strange state of alienation, akin to that of the laborer separated from the product of his labors. Unable to take sufficient responsibility for developing their ideas and selling them to major constituencies, leadership had to depend on the capacities of their staffs - legislative support staffs, program development staffs, and planning and evaluation staffs - all of which performed poorly. With neither their leaders' depth of understanding of the idea nor the extent of their commitment to Renewal, they obfuscated, hesitated or protected their flanks with a wall of established procedures.

In the descriptions offered by HEW top leadership I found luminescence about what Renewal was, what principles it embodied and

what it might do. In those of their lieutenants there was often garble and confusion, ambivalent attachment and defensiveness. The result was that in the Renewal episode the bureaucracy functioned like a federation of loosely connected units rather than as one coherent organization. Each unit was about as porous to communication from other units as the bureaucracy as a whole was to communication from outside its walls. For example, the Office of the Deputy Commissioner for Development was virtually walled off from the Office of Legislation and from the Office of Planning, Budgeting and Evaluation. Although they talked to each other, did they hear and understand each others' words? The same state persisted between the Office of the Commissioner and his Office of Legislation, and between the Office of the Secretary and the Office of Education as a whole.

The Renewal episode provides excellent material to substantiate George Reedy's insightful Twilight of the Presidency. Reedy argues that the most significant threat to democracy comes from the increasing isolation of its leaders from what is happening around them. In the subject under study here, the Secretary and the Commissioner were, I believe, systematically insulated from an accurate appraisal of what was happening with Renewal: what was happening in their own offices, in the Congress and in the outside world. It was not until the Cranston Amendment hit with a hammer-like blow that the mists began to clear. And by that time it was too late to stop the juggernaut of opposition that had begun to roll.

Renewal failed because its primary advocates neglected to alter their patterns of behavior when the situation in which they were

operating changed dramatically. Don Davies and his closest associates had operated in the Bureau of Educational Personnel Development with an apparently sufficient amount of anonymity, autonomy and impunity. There they were not stage-front but could pose unassumingly somewhere in the wings of power. Davies had one authority and one bureau and although there was a host of obstacles and restraints, it was his bureau. The rest of USOE left him pretty much alone. With the legislative eye focused on him he could hardly do as he pleased, but here too informal relations prevailed and the scrutiny of Congress was not markedly overbearing.

When he moved to the Deputy Commissionership all of the above no longer applied. He had several bureaus to direct; Congressional relations were henceforth controlled by formal mechanisms; and, given the intent of Renewal, what he did in DCD had a profound effect on other parts of the Office. Regrettably, he either consciously or unconsciously did not shift his behavior to suit the new situation. Instead of developing a legislative strategy taking into account the omnipresence of the Office of External Relations, he adopted a reactive stance. This meant that the legislative support people dictated the "next moves" and he acquiesced, albeit reluctantly. Instead of gathering and motivating a high-level, sophisticated planning capacity before making his move, he saw an opening for a "sparkling initiative" and jumped in, ill-prepared to fend off the forces that quickly enveloped him.

Renewal failed because certain elements in a Democratically-dominated Congress had been repulsed by the present Administration's attitude toward "shared governance under the Constitution". Members

had been lying in wait for a chance to "send them a message". In the Senate; a small, bipartisan, well-knit corps of staff members had worked on education issues for several years. They had become convinced of the inherent evil intent abiding in the hearts and minds of the bureaucrats "downtown". Their declared raison d'être was zealous protection of Congressional intent and prerogative. Because their principals, the Senators, had much more to do in the legislative arena than they could possibly handle, the door lay open for these "assiduous" staff members to prosecute in their own way the issues they chose. In the House, many of the same thoughts and feelings prevailed. But there the opportunity for Members to specialize in an area such as education was greater. So the Members - with the aid of staff rather than the other way around - legislated on basic matters of educational policy.

At the same time, there was relatively little danger that the wrist of Congress would be slapped in return for sending the bureaucrats "a message" on Renewal. The mix could not have been better: an initiative dreamed up by a long-time enemy, Don Davies, whose scalp at least some staffers had been after for quite a while; an initiative supported by a Commissioner of whom (to be generous) they were not fond, but who was stubborn enough to do battle with them; a program for whose implementation the agency had questionable authority under existing statutes, and for which the agency was not asking new authority; a program about whose quality a number of people were dubious, not only in Congress but in the agency itself.

The "dangers" of launching such an attack were minimal. After all, it wasn't the President's program; it did not come from the White

House. And because of this it would be possible to hit out at the Administration without seeming to attack the President: a nice combination. The magnitude of the program, in terms of dollars, was not great. Compared to others before the Congress, it was a very small piece, indeed. In no way, then, would Congress seem to be retrenching on its traditional advocacy of more resources for social programs. Finally, Congressional constituencies, those back home as well as those in the Washington-based associations, were assuredly not clamoring for Renewal; in fact, the tide of opinion seemed to be going the other way.

Given such a neat combination of pluses and a relative absence of minuses, it was hardly an opportunity to turn down.

Renewal failed because of a rift in world-view between the agency leadership in HEW and USOE and several principal Members of the Congress. Months after the battle was over, top HEW leadership still argued that the authority for Renewal lay with the agency under existing statutes; and of course key Members of Congress concerned with education took a verbal tack diametrically and uncompromisingly opposed to that. It is not the nature of such disagreement that surprises, for the Founding Fathers who wrote the specifications for our form of government were hopeful that this sort of institutionalized difference in view would result in creative tensions. On the issue before us, however, that which was designed for creative tension lapsed into a heavy-handed destructiveness. And it did so because of the degree of difference, not the nature of the difference.

What comes through with resounding clarity from a careful reading of Section 421-C of the Education Amendments of 1972 is how little of

what Elliott Richardson stood for is possible without enabling legislation in each and every case.

And finally, Renewal failed because its proponents assumed too readily that others would see its "inherent worth" and accept it with open arms. They failed to anticipate conceptual and political opposition. When opposition arrived they reacted with a degree of disbelief and convinced themselves rather euphorically that it would all go away. Who could resist the power of "an idea whose time had come?"

VI. INSTITUTIONAL AND PERSONAL POST MORTEMS

In the months which followed the Congressional compromise which truncated Renewal's future, profound changes took place both in the institutional character of the Office of Education and in the lives of the Administration officials who played major roles in the Renewal struggle. Some of those changes were attributable in part or in full to the havoc left in the wake of Renewal; others took place for reasons totally separate from the fate of Renewal.

Elliott Richardson left his post as Secretary of HEW in January, 1973, to assume that of Secretary of Defense. His successor, Caspar Weinberger, is just now (March, 1973) beginning to formulate the major directions that will characterize his stewardship of the agency.

Sidney P. Marland, Jr. was promoted to the post of Assistant Secretary of HEW for Education, which had been created under the Education Amendments of 1972. His portfolio includes responsibility for both the Office of Education and the new National Institute of Education.

Don Davies left the federal service in February, 1973 to become a fellow at Yale University's Center for the Study of Education. His intention is to study the role of consumer advocacy in the educational process, with an eye to establishing an institute that would foster greater consumer control of educational institutions.

For Davies the downfall of Renewal was a bitter professional and personal defeat. Whereas Richardson's career was hardly touched by what happened to Renewal and Marland's reputation was only slightly

tarnished, Davies' stature was severly diminished. During the summer and fall of 1972, while he was still in OE, he went through the motions of being a Deputy Commissioner essentially biding his time until the right opportunity outside government turned up.

Russ Wood, who had done so much of the initial conceptualizing of Renewal, was divested of his role as Davies' Deputy even before Renewal's demise, and was then effectively pushed into the background of the bureaucracy. The primary reason for this was that he had somehow managed to incur Marland's disfavor. And once Renewal's fate had been sealed his divestiture became final. Plans were made during the late spring for him to spend a year away from Washington working on a special project. When this turned out not to be possible he was given an office in a remote corner of one of the Division of Education's buildings, and he began work quietly on a project to study community involvement in educational decision-making.

Mary Hoag, who had been Davies' main link with Congress while he was at the Bureau of Education Professions Development and who had helped develop the first outlines of Renewal during Davies' first months on the job of Deputy Commissioner for Development, was detailed out of DCD in mid-1971. She spent several months in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of HEW for Planning and Evaluation, then moved to the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Programs in the Executive Office of the President.

Chris Cross, not mentioned by name in this case study but the person with primary responsibility for HEW's legislative relations in

the area of education, remained with the Department only until January, 1973. He then took a post with the Minority (Republican) Staff of the House of Representatives' Education Committee.

Mike Timpane, not mentioned by name in this study either but the person with primary responsibility for HEW's planning and evaluation activities in the area of education, remained with the Department only until December, 1972. He then left government service for a post at the Brookings' Institution in Washington, D.C.

Charles Saunders, OE's Deputy Commissioner for External Relations, who was working with Cross but who had greater proximity to the Renewal fray by dint of his lateral relationship to Davies, remained with the Division of Education. Recently he was promoted to the job of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Education for Policy Communication in Marland's Office.

Those who stayed and were not promoted - as of the writing of this document, the overwhelming majority of them, from $30,000-a-year people to $6,000-a-year people - are still going to work every day but have little of real substance to do.

Institutional "post mortems", although not as neatly packagable as personal ones, are just as important to recount, for they usually have longer-term, more widespread implications.

During the summer which followed the death of Renewal the atmosphere at DCD was wake-like. For a relatively prolonged period the OE people connected to or affected by the Renewal effort seemed to respond to their work like wax figures. They appeared to be transfixed,

vaguely uncomprehending, feebly expectant. Not surprisingly, almost nothing of consequence took place during the summer. There were a few mutterings by certain individuals about using "this quiet time to regroup and to rethink directions"; but the only tangible output of those sultry months was that the name of the office reverted to what it had been before the struggle - from "Office for Renewal" to "Office for Development".

In the early fall, after months of idleness, the "engines" of Renewal seemed to turn over again. Charles Saunders called together a "task force" composed of people from the Office for Development, the Office of External Relations and the Office for Planning, Budgeting and Evaluation in OE and from the Office of Planning and Evaluation and the Office of Legislation in the Secretary's Office. The job of the task force was to generate legislative specifications for a successor to Renewal: a program with all the attributes of Renewal but at the same time one attuned to overall Department objectives and more attractive to Congress than its predecessor.

The task force completed its mission and sent forth to the appropriate parties in the Office of the Secretary for their approval "new" legislative specifications. All who partook in the effort were aware, however, that Saunders' primary concern was really to save face for the agency with Congress. Congress had, after all, made a specific request to the Office of Education in the spring of 1972 to resubmit for consideration a Renewal proposal. It is interesting to note that Don Davies, although still at OE, had by his own choice very little to do with the work this task force undertook.

The legislative specifications which were drawn up were based on the assumption that relatively little new money would be available for the Office's discretionary programs. When the first inklings of the President's Fiscal 1974 Budget reached OE in December, 1972, it became clear that not only would there be no new money but that many discretionary programs were slated for eventual extinction. EPDA resources were to be severely curtailed, almost cut in half within a year. Environmental Education and Drug/Health and Nutrition Education were to be discontinued. Technology programs were to be cut back overall and the exciting ones, the demonstrations, put under NIE's wing, leaving only continuing endeavors like Sesame Street and The Electric Company in OE. Even these latter were to be granted fewer dollars. On the Statistics operation no final decisions were taken, but money was to be tight. In other words, the development of specifications for a successor to Renewal had largely been an academic exercise.

In effect, by the beginning of 1973 the erosion of dollars from Renewal's banks was almost total. By all indications it was not going to be too long before the Office for Development would be reorganized out of existence. The answer to the question, "What will OE be?" had been given: a checkwriting operation and nothing else. There would be no frontrunner program in it. Innovation would be the job of NIE which was separate from OE and of the National Foundation for Higher Education whose "pilot" was already housed in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Education.

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